According to truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. This book develops a more radical mentalist semantics by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Classical semantics analyzes an abstract sentence or utterance such as "Grass is green"; in attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as "Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green".

This note concerns the model theoretic properties of logics extending the first-order logic with monadic second-order variables equipped with the stationarity quantifier. The eight variations of the strong downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem down to <ℵ2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$<\aleph _2$$\end{document} for this logic with the interpretation of second-order variables as countable subsets of the structures are classified into four principles. The strongest of these four is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of CH and the (...) Diagonal Reflection Principle for internally clubness of S. Cox. We show that a further strengthening of this SDLS and its variations follow from the Game Reflection Principle of B. König and its generalizations. (shrink)

The chapters in this volume address a variety of issues surrounding quotation, such as whether it is a pragmatic or semantic phenomenon, what varieties of quotation exist, and what speech acts are involved in quoting. Quotation poses problems for many prevailing theories of language. One fundamental principle is that for a language to be learnable, speakers must be able to derive the truth-conditions of sentences from the meanings of their parts. Another popular view is that indexical expressions like "I" display (...) a certain fixity -- that they always refer to the speaker using them. Both of these tenets appear to be violated by quotation. This volume is suitable for scholars in philosophy of language, semantics, and pragmatics, and for graduate students in philosophy and linguistics. The book will also be useful for researchers in other fields that study quotation, including psychology and computer science. (shrink)

Continuing, we study the Strong Downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorems of the stationary logic and their variations. In Fuchino et al. it has been shown that the SDLS for the ordinary stationary logic with weak second-order parameters \. This SDLS is shown to be equivalent to an internal version of the Diagonal Reflection Principle down to an internally stationary set of size \. We also consider a version of the stationary logic and show that the SDLS for this logic in internal interpretation (...) \\) for reflection down to \ is consistent under the assumption of the consistency of ZFC \ “the existence of a supercompact cardinal” and this SDLS implies that the continuum is weakly Mahlo. These three “axioms” in terms of SDLS are consequences of three instances of a strengthening of generic supercompactness which we call Laver-generic supercompactness. Existence of a Laver-generic supercompact cardinal in each of these three instances also fixes the cardinality of the continuum to be \ or \ or very large respectively. We also show that the existence of one of these generic large cardinals implies the “\” version of the corresponding forcing axiom. (shrink)

Although corporate social innovation studies in developing countries acknowledge the importance of firm resources and capabilities for attaining social goals, they overlook the way in which these interact with broader institutions to generate successful outcomes. We address this gap by exploring the relationship between firm resources-capabilities and institutions that is conducive to meeting both business and social interests in developing countries. By employing a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of corporate social innovation projects performed by joint ventures of Dutch SMEs and (...) their local partners in developing countries, we show that firm resources and/or capabilities complement strong institutions in these countries. Corporate social innovation can also be facilitated by firm capabilities in running highly legitimate projects that substitute institutional voids in these economies, attesting to multiple paths that corporations can take to achieve social innovation. (shrink)

Quote marks, I claim, serve to select from the multiple ostensions that are produced whenever any expression is uttered; they act to constrain pragmatic ambiguity or indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by showing that the proffered account fares better than its rivals-the Name, Description, Demonstrative, and Identity Theories. Along the way I shall need to explain and emphasize that quoting is not simply the same thing as mentioning. Quoting, but not mentioning, relies on the use of conventional devices.

We prove that the automorphism group ofP(ω)/fin remains simple if ℵ2 Cohen reals are added to a model of ZFC+CH.

Moral philosophers widely believe that it is a part of the MEANING of 'ought' statements that they imply 'can' statements. To this thesis I offer three challenges, and then I conclude on a broader methodological note. (1) Epistemological Modal Argument: for all we know, determinism is true; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore we don’t know that 'ought' implies 'can'. (2) Metaphysical Modal Argument: determinism is conceptually possible; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore “ought implies can” is not an analytic (...) truth. (3) Semantic Argument: “You ought to X” is equivalent to “Do X!”; but “Do X!” does not entail that you can X, according to leading analyses of the imperative. (4) My two modal arguments are epistemologically significant, for they illustrate a general method for refuting a whole class of argument. (shrink)

We study combinatorial principles known as stick and club. Several variants of these principles and cardinal invariants connected to them are also considered. We introduce a new kind of side by-side product of partial orderings which we call pseudo-product. Using such products, we give several generic extensions where some of these principles hold together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. An iterative version of the pseudo-product is used under an inaccessible cardinal to show the consistency of the club (...) principle for every stationary subset of limits of ω1 together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. (shrink)

It is well known that in any nonstandard model of $\mathsf{PA}$ (Peano arithmetic) neither addition nor multiplication is recursive. In this paper we focus on the recursiveness of unary functions and find several pairs of unary functions which cannot be both recursive in the same nonstandard model of $\mathsf{PA}$ (e.g., $\{2x,2x+1\}$, $\{x^2,2x^2\}$, and $\{2^x,3^x\}$). Furthermore, we prove that for any computable injection $f(x)$, there is a nonstandard model of $\mathsf{PA}$ in which $f(x)$ is recursive.

We study L∞κ-freeness in the variety of Boolean algebras. It is shown that some of the theorems on L∞κ-free algebras which are known to hold in varieties such as groups, abelian groups etc. are also true for Boolean algebras. But we also investigate properties such as the ccc of L∞κ-free Boolean algebras which have no counterpart in the varieties above.

A partial ordering P is said to have the weak Freese-Nation property if there is a mapping tf : P → [P]0 such that, for any a, b ε P, if a b then there exists c ε tf∩tf such that a c b. In this note, we study the WFN and some of its generalizations. Some features of the class of Boolean algebras with the WFN seem to be quite sensitive to additional axioms of set theory: e.g. under CH, (...) every ccc complete Boolean algebra has this property while, under b 2, there exists no complete Boolean algebra with the WFN. (shrink)

For a regular cardinal κ with κ<κ = κ and κ ≤ λ , we construct generically a subset S of {x ∈ Pκλ : x ∩ κ is a singular ordinal} such that S is stationary in a strong sense but the stationarity of S can be destroyed by a κ+-c. c. forcing ℙ* which does not add any new element of Pκλ . Actually ℙ* can be chosen so that ℙ* is κ-strategically closed. However we show that such (...) ℙ* itself cannot be κ-strategically closed or even <κ-strategically closed if κ is inaccessible. (shrink)

The Demonstrative Theory holds that quoted matter is logically external to the quoting sentence, that quotation marks are (demonstratively) referential, and that quotation marks are grammatically required for autonomous mentioning. In contrast, the Identity Theory holds that quoted matter is integral to its quoting sentence, that quotation marks serve merely as disambiguating punctuation, and that mentionings need not be quotation-marked. I support the Identity Theory by pointing out fallacies in the arguments for demonstrative theories and by considering empty quotation, ordinary (...) language as found in casual use and in novels and plays, and historical and developmental facts about quotation. (shrink)